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This article re-interprets and develops Polanyi’s substantive institutionalist analysis of 
capitalist market economies and the market society in the light of two more recent 
approaches to the same issues.1 These are the Parisian 'regulation school' on 
contemporary capitalism and systems-theoretical accounts of the modern economy. 
All three regard the capitalist economy (or, for autopoietic systems theory, the 
market economy) as an operationally autonomous system that is nonetheless 
socially embedded and needful of complex forms of social regulation. For each, an 
adequate account of economic activities should explore how they are related to the 
wider social environment; how they are embedded in a wider nexus of social 
institutions; how the latter assist in reproducing the capitalist (or market) economy; 
and how their development is coupled to that of these and other environing 
institutions. There are also some important differences among these approaches, 
however, which enable an exploration of their respective limitations and also provide 
useful bases for further theoretical and empirical research. Thus, after presenting 
these three perspectives on the institutedness and embeddedness of economies, I 
consider some basic problems in analyzing the improbable stability and 
reproducibility of the capitalist economy, paying particular attention to governance 
and meta-governance.  
 
Polanyi on the Social Embeddedness of Substantively Instituted Economies 
 
Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) developed a distinctive approach to comparative analysis 
that stressed the substantive institutedness and social embeddedness of economies. 
He distinguished between a formal definition of economics as rational, economizing 
behaviour and a substantive definition of economics as want-satisfying behaviour. 
On this basis he then criticised the ‘economistic fallacy’ in which all economic 
conduct is seen as formally rational and economizing and the properties and 
dynamics of non-capitalist economies are thereby assimilated to those of market 
economies (see Polanyi 1977; also Block and Somers 1984). He considered the 
economy, in its substantive sense, as 'an instituted process of interaction between 
man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want-satisfying 
material means' (Polanyi 1982: 33). He added that, as an instituted process, '[t]he 
human economy ... is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and 
noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital. For religion or government 
may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary 
institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the toil of 
labor' (Polanyi 1982: 34). 
 
The study of how economies are instituted should start, Polanyi suggests, from how 
the economy acquires unity and stability, i.e., how the interdependence and 
recurrence of its parts get secured. He focused here on basic structural principles 
that might provide such unity and stability rather than on possible strategic or 
discursive sources of integration. And, given his interest in both market and non-
market economies, he focused on the dominant principle of distribution of 'want-
satisfying material means'. Polanyi identified three such principles associated with 
economic activities embedded in non-economic institutions: (a) reciprocity among 
similarly arranged or organized groupings (e.g., segmentary kinship groups); (b) 
redistribution through an allocative centre linked to a political regime; and (c) 
householding based on production to satisfy the needs of a largely self-sufficient unit 
such as a family, settlement, or manor (Polanyi 1944: 47-53; 1977: 34-47; 1982: 35). 
These principles of symmetry, centricity, and closure are contrasted with the anarchy 
of exchange as mediated through price-making markets in a disembedded and 
potentially self-regulating economy (1982: 35).2 In short, the capitalist market 
economy is only one form of organizing economic activity and should not be used as 
a transhistorical model for interpreting other economies. Polanyi further argued that 
trade is not necessarily organized in terms of monetary exchange: it can also be 
organized as a gift relationship in reciprocal relationships or be administered from 
above in redistributive systems (1982: 40-45). Symmetry, centricity, and market 
exchange can also be combined under the dominance of one principle. For example, 
reciprocity may be linked to turn-taking in work tasks (redistribution) and/or exchange 
at set equivalencies to benefit a partner short of certain necessities (Polanyi 1982: 
37). As well as its obvious role in historical and comparative analysis, this typology 
serves other (and partly moral) purposes for Polanyi: to establish the specificity of 
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the capitalist market economy and to show that distribution and trade need not be 
subordinated to monetary gain. 
 
Polanyi distinguished capitalist from non-capitalist economic relations in terms of 
their separation (or disembeddness) from non-economic institutions and their 
extension to the fictitious commodities of land, labour, and money. In pre-capitalist 
economies, the process of production was more or less firmly embedded in a wide 
variety of institutions such as the family, neighbourhood, community, etc. (Polanyi 
1944: 46-53; 1982: 30). Indeed it was this very embeddedness that led Polanyi to 
distinguish forms of economic life in terms of their principles of distribution rather 
than their relations of production. Thus he argued that, whilst it was often hard 
analytically to disentangle production from other social activities, one could generally 
identify the operational principles governing resource distribution.3 But the rise of 
capitalism involved the disembedding of production and distribution from all extra-
economic institutions, led to the growth of an autonomous market economy that 
operated in terms of profit-maximization, and even required the adaptation of 
essentially non-economic social relations and institutions to the demands of 
economic reproduction. Polanyi expresses this as follows: 
 
'Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are 
embedded in the economic system. The vital importance of the economic 
factor to the existence of society precludes any other result. For once the 
economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific 
motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a 
manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is 
the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy can function 
only in a market society' (Polanyi 1944: 57, italics added). 
 
This statement provides an important corrective to those one-sided readings of 
Polanyi that emphasise only the disembedding of the capitalist economy from pre-
capitalist social arrangements and institutions. But it is also misleading because it 
seems to suggest that social relations themselves subsequently get embedded in the 
economic system. Yet what Polanyi actually proposes is that society, in and through 
the agency of a wide range of social forces, seeks to constrain the destructive 
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anarchy of the free market by subjecting it to various forms of extra-economic 
regulation that nonetheless support and sustain capital accumulation. To the extent 
that these extra-economic forms become interiorised within and/or become 
structurally coupled to the market economy they may be said to be ‘embedded’ 
within it. But one could equally well (and with greater clarity) argue, as does Polanyi 
himself, that the market economy has been embedded within a market society. This 
is especially clear in his analysis of the four interconnected pillars that sustained and 
regularized the liberal regime -- the balance of power system, the international gold 
standard, the self-regulating market, and the liberal state (Polanyi 1944: 3). How and 
why this occurs (and thereby produces what regulationists would term a ‘mode of 
regulation’) will be considered later (for a presentation of the hierarchy of concepts 
that inform Polanyi’s historical and comparative analyses, see Figure 1). 
 
      
         Figure 1 about here 
 
 
In this and other respects, Polanyi's analysis anticipated some arguments of the 
Parisian regulation school. Thus, in his history of trade and markets as well as his 
economic anthropology, he argues that societal (institutional) conditions sustain the 
(circular) interdependence of economic movements and ensure their ‘recurrence’ 
(i.e., their continued reproduction) – without which neither the unity nor stability of the 
(instituted) economic process is possible. He writes that '[t]he instituting of the 
economic process vests that process with unity and stability; it produces a structure 
with a definite function in society; it shifts the place of the process in society, thus 
adding significance to its history; it centers interest on values, motives and policy. 
Unity and stability, structure and function, history and policy spell out operationally 
the content of our assertion that the human economy is an instituted process' 




The Regulation Approach 
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 Like Polanyi, regulationists reject the assumption of classical economics that there is 
a clearly delimited, socially disembedded sphere of economic relations with a 
tendency toward general equilibrium.4 They emphasize that economic rationality and 
dynamics cannot be adequately analyzed – even as a first approximation -- in terms 
of exchange relations between rational economic men oriented to the price 
mechanism in perfect markets. Instead, they are concerned with the socially 
embedded, socially regularized nature of capitalist economies rather than with pure, 
self-regulating market phenomena. In this sense, the regulation approach (hereafter 
RA) regards market forces as only one (albeit critically important) factor in capitalist 
expansion. For capitalism in its integral5 sense comprises extra-economic as well as 
economic factors. The former include institutions, collective identities, shared visions, 
common rules, norms, and conventions, networks, procedures, and modes of 
calculation. All have key roles in structuring, facilitating, and guiding (in short, 
'regulating' or, better, 'regularizing') accumulation. Thus the RA seeks to integrate the 
analysis of political economy with that of civil society and the state to show how they 
interact to 'normalize' the capital relation. It examines the social processes and 
struggles that define and stabilize modes of economic calculation and norms of 
economic conduct. Indeed, its concept of 'mode of regulation' covers the social as 
well as economic modes of economic regulation that secure the conditions for the 
otherwise improbable reproduction of a specific accumulation regime, i.e., a 
particular dynamic configuration of production and consumption (for a general 
introduction see Boyer 1990; for a recent encyclopaedic survey, see Boyer and 
Saillard 1995; for a recent critique, Jessop 1997a). 
 
The RA reminds one here in certain respects of Polanyi's account of the 'double 
movement' of capitalist development. He argued that the market economy achieved 
its apogee in the nineteenth century in a movement that effected the rise of laissez-
faire and the disembedding of the market from its earlier institutional context. This 
provoked a counter-movement from society (sic) expressed in attempts to re-embed 
market forces in social institutions and thereby to regulate (or, since this is not 
confined to law and the state, one might say 'to regularize') the market mechanism. 
The RA also examines how the ‘extensive accumulation regime’ of 'liberal capitalism' 
emerged from ancien régime economies, shows how this entailed the disembedding 
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of market forces from the old order, and notes how a ‘competitive mode of regulation’ 
and nightwatchman state had key roles in regularizing this accumulation regime.6 
Despite these commonalities, the RA does not share Polanyi's views on the 'double 
movement'. For it argues that liberal capitalism already had its own distinctive forms 
of social embedding and social regulation. Nonetheless its distinctive crisis-
tendencies eventually led to structural crises of (and not just within) liberal capitalism 
and its 'competitive mode of regulation'; and, after economic, social, and political 
struggles, a new regime emerged based on 'intensive accumulation' and a 
'monopolistic mode of regulation'. Thus, whereas Polanyi tends to depict a two-step 
movement from unregulated to regulated capitalism, the RA describes a crisis-
mediated movement from one regularized regime to another, each with its own 
dynamic and crisis-tendencies (for regulationist analyses of the ancien régime and 
liberal economies, see Boyer 1990; and Delorme and André 1982). 
 
Autopoietic Systems Theories and Governance 
 
Another approach concerned with the embedding and regularization of economic 
activities is the systems-theoretical analysis of so-called 'autopoietic' systems in 
modern, functionally differentiated societies. The concept of autopoiesis (or ‘self-
production’) denotes a class of systems (whether natural, social, or artificial) that are 
concerned, at least in the first instance, with their own self-reproduction. Such 
systems are self-constituting, self-organizing, and self-reproducing. Yet they co-exist 
and co-evolve in complex ways with other systems with which they are reciprocally 
interdependent. This paradoxical combination of operational autonomy and material 
interdependence poses problems regarding the external steering (governing, 
guiding, managing) and/or strategic coordination of different systems. 
 
An autopoietic system is self-constituting in so far as it defines and defends its own 
boundary vis-à-vis its self-defined external environment. It is also self-organizing 
because it has its own distinctive operational codes and programmes. Hence, while 
an autopoietic system may respond to changes in its environment and even change 
its organization in so doing, it does so in terms of its own codes and programmes. 
Interestingly this idea was anticipated, in the case of the market economy, by 
Polanyi, who notes that we have 'an economic system controlled, regulated, and 
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directed by markets alone; order in the production and distribution of goods is 
entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism ... Self-regulation implies that all 
production is for sale on the market and that all incomes derive from such sales. 
Accordingly, there are markets for all elements of industry, not only for goods 
(always including services) but also for labor, land, and money, their prices being 
called respectively commodity prices, wages, rent, and interest' (Polanyi 1944: 
68,69). In addition, an autopoietic system also secures the reproduction of its own 
elements through the use of its own elements. This feature is well illustrated by the 
market economy. For, as Polanyi again noted, it deals with 'inputs' such as labour-
power, land, and money as if they were commodities and subjects them to its own 
forms of economic calculation. More generally, the market economy could be seen 
as an autopoietic system to the extent that market forces define what will count as 
exchange-values, secure the exchange of the latter through market mechanisms, 
and also ensure the recurrence of market relations through the continuing circulation 
of commodities in exchange for money (cf. Luhmann 1986; Baecker 1988). 
 
An autopoietic system always co-exists with other systems that constitute key 
elements in its environment and depends on them for essential conditions for its own 
operation. And it is always structurally coupled to its environment through complex 
processes of co-evolution among reciprocally interdependent systems. The co-
evolution of different systems is also shaped by the 'lifeworld' (which Polanyi could 
be said to analyse in terms of ‘society’) that is formed by various social relations, 
identities, interests, and values not otherwise anchored in specific systems. In short, 
despite its capacity for self-valorization (or self-constitution, self-organization, and 
self-reproduction), the market economy is by no means wholly self-contained. 
Indeed, labour-power itself, despite its commodification (or, as Polanyi claims, its 
treatment as if it were a commodity), is largely reproduced outside any immediate 
capitalist labour process.7 This provides an important source of friction or resistance 
to the logic of capital – although how the market economy responds thereto will still 
depend primarily on its own profit-and-loss calculations.8 This explains the 
significance of trade unions, for example, which insert themselves into the economic 
process. For, even if changes in an autopoietic system’s environment are reflected in 
changes in its operation or structure, the latter will always be mediated by its own 
operating codes. 
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 This raises a problem regarding the steering of relations among functionally 
differentiated systems. For such systems are concerned in the first instance with 
their own self-reproduction rather than with their impact on other systems; yet they 
are also resistant to any external 'steering' based on top-down management or direct 
intervention. Autopoietic systems analysis connects here to more middle-range 
research on organizational and institutional governance. This includes work on 
modes of coordination that could serve as an alternative to the anarchy (or invisible 
hand) of the market and the hierarchy of imperative coordination (e.g., the iron fist of 
the state or bureaucratic command). These alternatives are based on 'heterarchy', 
i.e., self-organization among mutually interdependent actors. . Polanyi gives several 
examples of such self-organization as well as of state intervention in describing how 
‘society’ defends itself against the anarchy of the market (see below). The forms of 
heterarchy include interpersonal networking, inter-organizational negotiation, and 
'de-centred intersystemic context steering'. The last basically involves efforts to steer 
(guide) a given system by modifying the circumstances in which its operating codes 
are applied rather than through externally imposed imperative coordination. This can 
be illustrated through the use of taxes rather than law to guide market forces (see 
Glagow and Willke 1987; Willke 1992).  
 
Rethinking Market Society  
 
Orthodox historical materialism argues that accumulation is the dominant principle of 
societal organization in every capitalist social formation.9 All three approaches 
presented above offer good reasons to reject this orthodoxy. Each seems to accept 
that capital accumulation in its pure form10 occurs where the key inputs into capitalist 
production take the form of (perhaps fictitious) commodities; where there is effective 
capitalist control over labour-power in production; where the non-economic social 
and material environment is sufficiently stable to enable enterprises to orient their 
activities to opportunities for profit; and where profits can be realized and re-invested 
in a new round of capitalist production. But none concludes from the presence of 
these conditions that the entire society must thereby be to the market.  
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On the contrary, each approach implies that the universal spread of the commodity 
form and the resulting dominance of market forces and profit-and-loss calculation 
throughout society could prove self-destructive. This is certainly Polanyi’s message. 
Regulationists likewise emphasise the necessarily social as well as economic form of 
capitalist reproduction even during the period of liberal accumulation regimes. And 
autopoieticists claim that the smooth functioning of modern societies depends 
critically on maintaining the operational autonomy of each and every one of its 
functional subsystems. In short, for all three approaches, capital accumulation 
always and everywhere depends on a precarious and changing balance between 
commodity relations and other forms of social organization. This dependence 
generates a complex, conflictual, and contradictory process involving recurrent shifts 
in the relative weight of commodification, decommodification, and recommodification 
(cf. Offe 1975). In turn this highlights the importance of analyzing how far market 
forces (and their profit-seeking logic) penetrate the social world and of examining the 
conditions the conditions for such penetration to be reproduced. 
 
There are four interrelated ways in which market forces and profit-seeking can come 
to dominate society. First, the commodity form and the logic of exchange can be 
extended to labour, land, and money11 and then into new spheres of social life. Neo-
liberalism, for example, (re-)commodifies political, educational, health, welfare, 
scientific, and other activities to organize them as businesses oriented to exploiting 
opportunities for profit without regard to possible extra-economic costs and benefits. 
Second, even domains or activities that, for whatever reason, retain a primarily non-
commercial orientation can be subjected to a secondary economic coding. This 
occurs when choices among formally non-commercial activities are influenced by 
'profit-and-loss' or economic 'cost-benefit' calculations. This trend is reflected in 
Polanyi's argument that the novelty of nineteenth century civilization lay in its 
tendency to judge all social events from the economic viewpoint (1944: 33-34). It is 
seen today in neo-liberal encouragement to educational, health, scientific, and other 
decision-makers to consider how their activities impact financially on the individual, 
organizational, and institutional levels and/or on the (perceived or discursively 
constructed) imperatives of a strong, internationally competitive economy. 
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Third, the superior dynamism and reach of a globalizing capitalist economy may 
cause more problems substantively for other systems than they cause for it. In other 
words, in the multilateral structural coupling of systems, other systems adjust more 
to the logic of accumulation than the capitalist economy incurs costs in adjusting to 
them. This is implied in Polanyi’s claim, quoted above, that a market economy can 
only function in a market society. This asymmetrical interdependence among 
institutional orders is rooted in capital’s greater capacity to escape the constraints 
and controls of other systems. This can occur through its own internal operations in 
time (discounting, insurance, risk management, futures, etc.) or space (capital flight, 
relocation, extra-territoriality, etc.) or through attempts to corrupt or commodity these 
systems. Fourth, a successful hegemonic project may establish accumulation as the 
dominant principle of societalization. This can be seen in the increasing demand for 
other spheres of social life on spatial scales from the local to the continental to 
accept the 'imperatives' of 'structural' or 'systemic' competition, i.e., competition that 
goes beyond narrow economic criteria to include wholesale restructuring of any 
organizations and institutions that might bear on competitiveness.  
 
These tendencies have their own particular bases and may even partly counteract 
each other. The first is rooted in the search to establish and extend the bases of a 
self-regulating market economy and to find new sources of valorization; the second 
is rooted in attempts to impose the economizing, profit-seeking logic of accumulation 
on other systems that are not (or cannot be) fully integrated into the market 
economy; the third is rooted in the evolutionary logic of structural coupling or co-
evolution; and the fourth is rooted in struggles for hegemony and/or in asymmetric 
interactions between capitalism and other orders. 
 
Where these four tendencies are mutually reinforcing the market economy can be 
consolidated in a market society. Thus, as Polanyi puts it, the consolidation of the 
market mechanism 'means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the 
market’ (1944: 57). Such a correspondence between market economy and market 
society is reminiscent of Gramsci's account of the 'historical bloc', i.e., 'the necessary 
reciprocity between structure and superstructure' (Gramsci 1971: 366). The 
emergence and survival of such an historical bloc between market economy and 
market society is always problematic, provisional, and unstable. If the self-regulating 
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market economy requires that 'society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow 
that system to function according to its own laws' (Polanyi 1944: 57), then we must 
ask how this alleged necessity comes to be contingently realized. Four ways in may 
happen have just been suggested. Where they interact in a structurally coherent 
manner, we have a 'capitalist society' or, more precisely, the dominance of capitalist 
societalization. 
 
Approaching capitalist societalization in these terms also provides a way to think 
about sources of resistance to capitalist dominance or hegemony. Each of the four 
tendencies has its own limits and counter-tendencies and is associated with its own 
form(s) of resistance. First, in so far as valorization has become dominant in different 
domains, class struggles proper can develop. These can emerge both in the 
capitalist economy in its narrow sense – notably in the labour market and labour 
process that together comprise the main field of economic class struggle between 
capital and labour but also in respect of the commodification of land and money – 
and in the many and varied extra-economic contexts that are essential to capitalist 
exploitation. In the latter regard Polanyi argues strongly not only that class interests 
are not just economic (1944: 152-4) but also that there is a general societal interest 
that overrides particular class interests (1944: **). Indeed he even argues that the 
reaction of classes to unregulated market forces is one of the ways in which ‘society’ 
resists its destruction by the market (1944: 132, quoted below). More generally, if 
commodification is pushed too far it will generate 'market failures' (or other 
manifestations of economic crisis) that threaten the overall material and/or social 
reproduction of capital.  
 
Second, in domains where another code or institutional logic remains primary, 
agents may resist the imposition of profitability as a secondary code. For this would 
threaten the codes, programmes, and operational integrity of other systems as well 
as the rich variety of values, norms, vocabularies, and identities of the lifeworld. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the representatives of other systems and social forces in 
the lifeworld will resist attempts at commodification from diverse perspectives. It is in 
this context that Polanyi criticizes the vulgar Marxist tendency to overemphasize 
class struggles, notes the importance of non-class bases of resistance to the logic of 
the market economy, and also highlights the wide range of forces that respond more 
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or less spontaneously to the many threats posed to ‘society’ by the spread of market 
forces (Polanyi 1944: 132,149,152). Thus he writes:  
 
‘While monetary interests are necessarily voiced solely by the persons to 
whom they pertain, other interests have a wider constituency. They affect 
individuals in innumerable ways as neighbors, professional persons, 
consumers, pedestrians, commuters, sportsmen, hikers, gardeners, 
patients, mothers, or lovers – and are accordingly capable of 
representation by almost any type of territorial or functional association 
such as churches, townships, fraternal lodges, clubs, trade unions, or, 
most commonly, political parties based on broad principles of adherence’ 
(Polanyi 1944: 154). 
 
Although this passage tends to prioritize resistance from the lifeworld, his reference 
to professional persons and patients hints at resistance in terms of the logic of other 
systems too. Nor should we ignore the self-limitations due to market failures of 
different kinds (e.g., the continuing limits to the commodification of information and 
knowledge) and the repercussions of the market economy on social cohesion.  
 
Regarding the third and fourth tendencies, struggles can occur over the dominant 
principle of societalization. These take the form of hegemonic struggles and counter-
struggles over those forms of 'common sense', worldviews, etc., that posit capital 
accumulation as the desirable and/or necessary condition for accomplishing other 
social goals. Given his eye for historical detail, it is unsurprising that Polanyi also 
recognises these issues. He not only alludes to the tendency for the logic of a fully 
constituted market economy to become irresistible (see above) but also notes the 
role of hegemonic struggles around the entrenchment or rolling back of the 
expansive logic of the market. Thus he suggests that the double movement  
 
‘can be personified as the action of two organizing principles in society, 
each of them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of 
definite social forces and using its own distinctive methods. The one was 
the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-
regulating market, relying on the support of the trading classes, and using 
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largely laissez-faire and free trade as its methods; the other was the 
principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature 
as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of those 
most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market – 
primarily, but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes – and 
using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments 
of intervention as its methods' (1944: 132).  
 
This argument can be taken further not only by noting the different economic and 
political programmes and ethico-political visions into which economic liberalism is 
articulated but also by considering the range of counter-hegemonic projects that can 
be developed to resist the onward march of liberalism. For, if society’s fightback is to 
move beyond dispersed, disorganized, and mutually contradictory struggles, 
attention must be paid to the ways in which ‘society’ acquires a relative unity and 
cohesion in resisting capital’s unhampered logic. For, as Polanyi argues, the reaction 
of society to the destructive impact of liberal market forces is not conducted merely 
in terms of sectional interests but in the name of the general interest of society as a 
whole. This is where the role of specific economic, political, and social projects, of 
hegemonic visions, and of associated strategic capacities becomes crucial. Indeed, 
as Polanyi was well aware, it makes a world of difference whether this resistance is 
conducted under the dominance of fascism,12 social democracy, corporate liberalism 
à la New Deal, or a communist regime. And he also saw a maximally decentralized 
socialism (his preferred alternative, which would overcome the institutional 
separation of the economic and the political) as ‘essentially, the tendency inherent in 
an industrial civilization to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously 
subordinating it to a democratic society’ (1944: 234). 
 
This approach to the market economy and market society provides a novel way of 
interpreting Polanyi's analysis of the 'double movement'. In this regard we can 
usefully distinguish four key points implicit in Polanyi’s analysis of this dual process. 
First, the double movement involved continuous expansion of the market and 
attempts to protect ‘society’ from this first movement. Second, although the 
countermovement was essential to defend society from the annihilating effects of the 
commodification of land and labour, ‘in the last analysis it was incompatible with the 
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self-regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself’ (Polanyi 1944: 
130). In this sense it could not be taken too far without undermining the market 
economy. This point highlights the ‘autopoietic’ nature of the market economy, i.e., 
its resistance to outside intervention. Given the autonomization of the economy, 
society had to be shaped to allow that system to function according to its own laws. 
Third, this meant that the many and varied interventions of ‘society’ (most notably, 
but by no means solely, through the state) were limited to ‘checking the action of the 
market in respect to the factors of production, labor, and land’ (1944: 131). Fourth, in 
other respects, the effect of the dual movement was to embed social relations within 
the market rather than to re-embed the economy within social relations (1944: 57). 
 
This interpretation, while consistent with Polanyi's own study of the dual movement, 
offers four theoretical advantages. First, it provides a more complex and concrete 
account of the tendency of a market economy to extend its reach into society, 
disembedding individuals from the wider ensemble of interpersonal relations, 
organizational affiliations, institutional and community roots, and broader societal 
frameworks within which they operate. Second, it provides a more complex and 
concrete account of how 'society' fights back against this disembedding process. In 
particular, as Polanyi often notes, this reaction is neither directed against market 
forces (or capitalism) as such nor is it a reaction of 'society' as such. Instead it is a 
complex series of reactions at many different points in social space to specific 
conflicts, crisis-tendencies, and contradictions associated with the unregulated 
extension of market forces (on this point see also the insightful commentary in 
Olofsson 1995). Third, by integrating Polanyi’s conclusions with the arguments of 
autopoietic systems theory, it offers a theoretically more sophisticated analysis of the 
limits to external intervention into the market (or capitalist) economy once this has 
reached ‘autopoietic takeoff’. This analysis also facilitates research on the structural 
coupling of the market (or capitalist) economy with other systems (legal, political, 
educational, medical, etc.) and the lifeworld to produce a social formation dominated 
by the principles of accumulation. But, fourth, drawing on the insights of regulationist 
and autopoietic systems theories into the modalities and dynamics of governance, 
the proposed approach can also provide new ideas not only about the manner in 
which social relations get embedded into the market economy but also how the latter 
may also be re-embedded into the wider society. 
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Rethinking Social Embeddedness 
 
After this detour via reflections on the market society and market economy, we return 
to social embeddedness. This is an increasingly popular but confusingly polyvalent 
concept. The discussion above suggests it is useful to distinguish three levels of 
social embeddedness.13 The first level is often discussed in recent work in economic 
sociology, namely, the 'social embeddedness' of interpersonal economic relations 
(cf. Granovetter 1985). Such research focuses on the multiple networks in which 
economic actors are embedded (or, following Callon 1998, ‘entangled’) and on their 
differential and changing impact on such actors’ identities, interests, capacities, and 
practices. Indeed, theorists of interpersonal embeddedness tend to show what Adam 
Smith knew long ago: that economic actors tend to make strenuous efforts to re-
entangle economic relations in a nexus of social relations as a crucial condition for 
the stability and predictability of markets. On an individual level this is reflected in the 
relative (dis)advantages of strong or loose ties among individuals and associated 
problems of trust in situations of reciprocal interdependence. It is tempting to claim 
that Polanyi’s historical and/or anthropological studies introduced this level of 
analysis in dealing with the embedding of economic activities within a wider nexus of 
social relations. But this would be anachronistic as Polanyi also took pains to note 
that such activities were not subject to the sort of economizing, profit-and-loss 
calculation that typifies contemporary economic activities.14 At best, then, one could 
refer to his discussion of haute finance, cooperatives, friendly societies, self-help, 
etc., as mechanisms for the interpersonal embedding of market-oriented economic 
action. 
 
The second level of embeddedness is what we might describe as the ‘institutional 
embeddedness’ of inter-organizational relations (cf. Grabher, 1993). These relations 
can be studied in some respects with the same basic tools as interpersonal relations 
but they also have important emergent properties that require fresh analytical tools. 
Thus organization theorists and ‘new institutionalists’ have explored the difficulties 
involved in securing the internal cohesion and adaptability of individual organizations; 
and in rendering compatible their respective operational unities and independence 
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with their de facto material and social interdependence on other organizations. 
Negotiation has a key role here in reconciling these conflicting interests by identifying 
common short-term objectives and using these to promote longer-term cooperation 
in joint projects (cf. Mayntz 1993; Scharpf 1994). Studies of this form of economic 
embeddedness focus on the specificities of strategic alliances, inter-firm networks, 
etc., their path-dependent character, and the mechanisms of organizational learning. 
They also suggest that the capacity to steer inter-organizational relations often 
depends critically on effective interpersonal networks that can stretch social relations 
over time and space by drawing on interpersonal trust. Although Polanyi did not 
explicitly theorize this aspect of embeddedness, it is implicit in his analysis of haute 
finance (see below). 
 
The third level is that of the 'societal' embeddedness of functionally differentiated 
institutional orders in a complex, de-centred society. This is where Polanyi's work is 
most relevant and where, pace Swedberg (1997),15 the concept of embeddedness is 
critical to an understanding of his work. For he examined the embedding of market 
relations in traditional societies; their disembedding to form a market economy; and 
the latter’s re-articulation with other forms of social relations to create a modern 
market society. If traditional societies are characterized, for Polanyi, by the 
embedding of substantive economies in the wider society, modern market 
economies are marked both by their institutional separation (disembedding) from 
traditional (pre-modern) institutions and by the interiorisation of extra-economic 
constraints within the logic of market forces themselves (so that ‘social relations are 
embedded within the economic system’) as well as by external regulation.  
So Callon errs in claiming that Polanyi notes only ‘the existence of an institutional 
frame constituting the (sc. external) context in which economic activities take place’ 
(1998: 8). This does serious disservice to the richness of his economic anthropology 
and studies of market economies. Polanyi also discusses problems posed by re-
embedding the market economy so that it is socially controlled rather than left to the 
anarchic logic of laissez-faire (Polanyi 1944). This third level is also one where the 
RA and autopoietic theory have much to offer and, indeed, where they may conflict 
with Polanyi's work (cf. Luhmann 1995; Glagow and Willke, 1987). Their key 
contribution here lies in their account of how inter-systemic heterarchy involves 
problems of material and social interdependence among operationally autonomous 
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(or closed) functional systems, each with its own codes, programmes, institutional 
logics, and interests in self-reproduction.  
 
This latter set of problems was addressed by Polanyi, who argued that the material 
and social interdependencies between economics, politics, and civil society cannot 
be coordinated simply through the market mechanism. In particular, he noted the key 
role of haute finance in the golden age of laissez-faire ‘as the main link between the 
political and the economic organization of the world in this period … a permanent 
agency of the most elastic kind … the nucleus of one of the most complex 
institutions the history of man has produced’ (Polanyi 1944: 10,11).16 The 
importance of interpersonal relations to the governance of inter-organizational 
relations is taken one stage higher here through the dependence of inter-systemic 
linkages on inter-organizational relations. For not only did haute finance rest on an 
interpersonal network with diasporic as well as national dimensions, it also depended 
on a complex web of interorganizational relations that connected the different logics 
of the economic, political, and military systems on both national and international 
levels. Indeed one could see Polanyi as a pioneering student of ‘international 
regimes’ as well as of ‘national modes of regulation’ as governance mechanisms in 
so far as he claimed that nineteenth-century civilization rested on the balance of 
power system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and the 
liberal state (Polanyi 1944: 3). The first two of these are political and economic 
regimes of international scope, the latter two are structurally coupled and co-
dependent governance mechanisms that are more national in scope. 
 
In this sense, Polanyi developed a pre-theoretical understanding of the inherently 
spatio-temporal nature of (dis)embedding. His analysis of the four main pillars of 
nineteenth-century civilization identified a specific spatio-temporal fix based on the 
balance of power system, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, 
and the liberal state. This was appropriate to the golden age of laissez-faire and, as 
Polanyi notes, crises in any one of these pillars triggered counter-movements to limit 
the damage caused by the market mechanism (see especially 1944: 208-19). 
Radical American economists from the ‘social structure of accumulation’ school, 
which is one of seven parallel traditions in the RA (see Kotz et al., 1994; and Jessop 
1990), also identify four pillars that stabilized postwar Atlantic Fordism, namely, a 
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capital-labour compromise, a capital-capital accord, a worker-citizen compromise, 
and an international settlement based on ‘embedded liberalism’ (e.g., Bowles et al., 
1983; on embedded liberalism, see also Keohane 1984). More recently I have 
addressed the problems involved in finding a new and appropriate spatio-temporal fix 
for the globalizing post-Fordist economy as it undergoes a fresh round of neo-liberal 
disembedding (Jessop 1999). Polanyi would easily recognize the destructive 
consequences of the newly expanded freedom of disembedded capital to ‘flow’ freely 
through space and time. However, capital has also its own particular productive and 
reproductive needs that can only be materialized only in specific types of spatio-
temporal location and, as Polanyi might have argued, this provides a new round of 
opportunities for the ‘double movement’ to operate.  
 
The details of these different analyses are less important here than the more general 
recognition that a key dimension of market relations is how they are disembedded 
from particular locales and time horizons and re-embedded in others. This can be 
considered from the double viewpoint of ‘time-space distantiation’ and ‘time-space 
compression’. The former stretches social relations over time and space so that they 
can be controlled or coordinated over longer periods of time (including into the ever 
more distant future) and over longer distances, greater areas, or more scales.17 Its 
relation to embedding is complicated in so far as the stretching of social relations 
tends both to disembed them from particular local contexts and to embed them in 
spatially more extensive interpersonal or inter-organizational networks of control. 
This is reflected in more extensive spatial divisions of labour and/or organizational 
coordination. Time-space compression involves the intensification of ‘discrete’ events 
in real time18 and/or increased velocity of materiel and immaterial flows over a given 
distance. This also has an ambiguous relation to (dis)embedding processes. For 
even hypermobile financial capital which appears to operate in a space of flows 
rather than being tied to particular locales actually needs operational bases in global 
cities (or similar urban spaces) with appropriate and distinctive kinds of material, 
immaterial, and social infrastructures (cf. Cox 1997; Sassen 1996).  
 
Governance and Meta-Governance as (Re)Embedding Mechanisms 
 
 18
These ambiguities in the spatio-temporal embedding of capital flows reflect a broader 
set of contradictions in capitalism. For, as Polanyi emphasized, the very process of 
commodification induced by the spread of the market mechanism generates various 
contradictions unresolvable through that mechanism. This point can be generalized 
by referring to Marx’s analysis of the principal contradictions inscribed in the most 
basic forms of the capitalist mode of production. Thus the commodity is both an 
exchange-value and a use-value; the worker is both abstract labour and a concrete 
individual; the wage is both a cost of production and a source of demand; money is 
both international currency and national money; productive capital is both abstract 
value in motion and a concrete stock of time- and place-specific assets in the course 
of being valorized; taxation is both a deduction from revenue and a source of 
demand; and so on. These contradictions prove more or less manageable depending 
on the specific ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ and the institutionalized class compromises 
with which they are from time to time associated. It is in disrupting past fixes and 
compromises without providing a new structured coherence for continued capital 
accumulation that neo-liberal forms of globalization appear to be so threatening to 
many capitalist – let alone other – interests. 
 
This raises a series of problems concerning market failure and crises. For example, 
when existing embedding and governance mechanisms failed in nineteenth-century 
capitalism, including the central role of that heterarchic governance mechanism par 
excellence materialized in haute finance, what happened next? Polanyi argues that 
the state stepped in. He writes that 
 
‘In the last resort, impaired self-regulation of the market led to political 
intervention. When the trade cycle failed to come round and restore 
employment, when imports failed to produce exports, when bank reserve 
regulations threatened business with a panic, when foreign debtors 
refused to pay, governments had to respond to the strain. In an 
emergency the unity of society asserted itself through the medium of 
intervention’ (Polanyi 1944: 206, cf. 207-8). 
 
Thus Polanyi suggested that the historical record shows that markets work in the 
shadow of hierarchy – not only in the shadow of haute finance as a peak level 
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heterarchic coordination mechanism but also in the shadow of the state, which would 
always intervene in the last resort to protect society. But Polanyi was also well 
aware, of course, of the limits to intervention. It is in this context that it is worth 
revisiting the autopoieticists’ idea of ‘de-centred context steering’. 
 
Haute finance can be seen as one mechanism of such steering. No doubt those 
involved took account of the operating codes and rationalities of the prevailing 
economic and political systems as well as their various substantive, social, and 
spatio-temporal interdependencies. They would also have been concerned to 
promote mutual understanding between these systems (‘noise reduction’) as well as 
to engage in negotiation, negative coordination, and positive cooperation in shared 
projects. But they could not master all the structural contradictions nor manage all 
the strategic dilemmas that were entailed in laissez-faire capitalism. Sooner or later 
the state would be forced by social pressures (the counter-movement of society) to 
intervene. But in the current stage of capitalist development, with its far greater 
entangling of scales of economic and political action resulting from the complex 
dialectic of globalization-regionalization, even these last resort powers of the 
sovereign national state have been challenged. This points to the need for new and 
even more reflexive forms of meta-governance.  
 
Meta-governance is concerned with the collibration of governance mechanisms, i.e., 
with the overall organization and balancing of the different forms of coordination of 
complex reciprocal interdependence (on the idea of collibration, see Dunsire 1996). 
In addition to meta-governance practices within the more or less separate fields of 
anarchic market exchange, hierarchical organizations, and heterarchic self-
organization, there is also extensive scope for meta-governance practices that steer 
the evolving relationship among these different modes of coordination. The latter are 
concerned to provide the ground rules for governance, ensure the compatibility of 
different governance mechanisms and regimes, deploy a relative monopoly of 
organizational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive 
expectations, act as a 'court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over 
governance, serve to re-balance power differentials by strengthening weaker parties 
or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion, etc.. Thus it 
involves shaping the context within which governance arrangements are forged 
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rather than developing specific strategies and initiatives for them. To the extent that 
these practices are oriented to inserting the neo-liberal globalizing market economy 
into a new cosmopolitan market society, they would provide the basis for that ‘co-
existence’ in market societies for which Polanyi argued and struggled (for further 
discussion of meta-governance, see Jessop 1998). 
  
Some (All Too) Brief Concluding Remarks 
 
The preceding remarks have discussed some convergencies and complementarities 
between Polanyi’s institutionalism, the regulation approach, and autopoietic systems 
theory. There are also display some basic differences. Thus Polanyi was strongly 
interested in modes of distribution in pre-capitalist as well as in capitalist 
economies.19 In contrast, regulationists have so far been mainly interested in 
different forms of capitalism and give more weight to the specifically capitalist nature 
of the production process.20 Moreover, while regulationists share Polanyi’s emphasis 
on the wage relation and money form as defining features of capitalism, they show 
less interest in the commodification of ‘land’ (nature).21 Above all, they propose new 
and exciting ways to think about the economic and extra-economic conditions that 
help to secure an always provisional and unstable capitalist order. In this regard they 
help us to extend and refine Polanyi’s analyses. Finally, systems theorists are more 
interested in the overall evolution of societies so that their typology of economic 
systems and account of the latter’s evolution differ from Polanyi and the 
regulationists. They see modern economic systems as comprising formally free 
activities oriented to 'profit-and-loss' and stress the mediating role of money and 
market forces. They are particularly insightful regarding the problems of regulation 
that derive from the modern economy’s simultaneous independence as an 
operationally autonomous system and its complex structural interdependence with 
other functional systems. In this regard they help us to understand the roots of 
Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ in the system world as well as the lifeworld. And they 
also offer useful suggestions on how the market economy could be governed so that 
it co-exists with, rather than threatens, other institutional orders.  
 
It is this combination of convergences, complementarities, and differences that has 
facilitated the double-sided critique in this article. Thus I have tried not only to 
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disclose some weaknesses in Polanyi’s analysis but also to show how his work can 
be used to improve the other two accounts of modern economies. Four main 
innovations have been suggested. First, I have offered a more detailed analysis of 
the various forms and levels of social embeddedness and their interconnections. 
Polanyi’s analysis of haute finance is particularly illuminating here. Second, I have 
given a more detailed analysis of the self-organizing logic of a market economy and 
its implications for the limits of intervention. Here I have drawn both on Marx’s 
analysis of the historical conditions of the self-valorization of capital within the circuit 
of capital and on the self-avowedly anti-Marxist arguments of autopoietic systems 
theory.22 The former provides far better insights into the structural contradictions and 
strategic dilemmas inscribed in capitalist market relations and thus into the inherent 
limitations of the extension of the commodity form to labour-power, land, and money. 
The latter offers a necessary corrective to the reductionist temptation in Marxist 
theorizing to see the logic of the capitalist market economy as somehow determinant 
‘in the last instance’ of an entire social formation. I have argued that Polanyi’s 
account of the dual movement is located at the intersection of these two approaches.  
 
Third, I have provided a more detailed analysis of capitalist societalization – or the 
forms of what Polanyi called the market society – and of the mechanisms through 
which the logic of the market economy comes to dominate and hegemonize the 
wider society and the various forms and sites of resistance thereto. This is intended 
both as a corrective to Marxist reductionism by specifying the various economic and 
extra-economic mechanisms through which a social formation could come to be 
dominated by the logic of capital; and as a way of revealing the richness of Polanyi’s 
own reflections on the dialectics of the dual movement through which a market 
economy first develops through its disembedding from pre-capitalist institutions and 
is then (re-)embedded in a market society. 
 
Fourth, I have identified how the ‘dual movement’ that structurally couples the market 
economy with other systems and the lifeworld can be subjected – always, of course, 
within certain limits – to appropriate forms of governance and meta-governance. In 
this way the primary sources of society’s counter-movement, i.e., the more extreme 
manifestations of the formal rationality of market forces, can be tamed through the 
more reflexive, dialogical rationality of governance. I believe this is one way in which 
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we can rethink the possibilities of co-existence between the market economy and 





1 This article derives from an oral presentation at the Sixth Karl Polanyi Conference, 
Montreal, October 1996. Its written version has benefited from the comments of 
Fikret Adaman, Pat Devine, Marguerite Mendell, Klaus Nielsen, Gunnar Oloffson, 
several conference participants, and two anonymous referees for the present journal. 
2 The first, second, and fourth of these principles provide an interesting parallel with 
the three main principles of governance: heterarchy or horizontal self-organization, 
imperative coordination through hierarchy, and the anarchy of market exchange. 
3 The Althusserian structural Marxist approach to pre-capitalist modes of production 
makes much the same points about the complex articulation between the economic 
and extra-economic in constituting social relations of production, even noting the 
importance of politics (for the ancient mode) and religion (for the feudal), but it also 
tries to explain this in terms of 'economic determination in the last instance' (i.e., in 
terms how surplus labour is appropriated in different epochs). For an otherwise 
laudatory critique of Polanyi on the latter lines, see Godelier (1988). For 
representative work, see Althusser and Balibar 1977; Cutler et al., 1977; and Terray 
1972. 
4 The Parisian regulationists acknowledge Polanyi’s influence alongside that of Marx, 
Keynes, and Kalecki: see R. Boyer (1995) ‘Aux origines de la théorie de la 
régulation’, in R. Boyer and Y. Saillard, eds, Théorie de la régulation. L'État des 
savoirs, Paris: La Découverte, 21-30. For a regulationist hommage to Polanyi, see R. 
Boyer (1995) ‘The Great Transformation of Eastern Europe: a “Regulationist 
Perspective”’, Emergo, 2 (4), 25-41. For a useful (and, as far as I am aware, a 
unique) comparison of Polanyi’s institutionalism and the early Parisian regulationist 
work, see L. Mjøset (1985) ‘Regulation and the Institutionalist Tradition’, in L. Mjøset 
and J. Bohlin, Introduksjon til Regulieringskolen: tre Arbeidsnotater, Aalborg: 
Arbeidspapirer fra Nordisk Sommeruniversitet, Nr 21, 1-101. 
                                                                                                                                        
5 Following Gramsci’s analysis of the integral state (lo stato integrale) as comprising 
‘political society + civil society’ Gramsci (1971: 251). we could analyse the integral 
economy in terms of ‘accumulation regime + mode of regulation’. 
6 For useful summaries of these arguments, see Noël 1987 and Dunford 1990. 
7 In this sense it is a 'fictitious commodity'. 
8 Even where profit-making activities are subject to legal or other constraints, firms 
will calculate whether it is cost-effective to break the law or ignore the other 
constraints. Orthodox economics theorizes this in terms of ‘efficient breach of law’. 
9 This claim goes beyond Marx’s claim: ‘[a]ccumulate, accumulate! That is Moses 
and the prophets!’ (1867: 854). This expresses the viewpoint of the individual 
capitalist to investment and consumption rather than to the need for the overall 
organization of society to adapt to the imperatives of capital accumulation. 
10 Accumulation can occur, of course, where capitalist and non-capitalist relations co-
exist as in the phase of primitive accumulation or slavery in the Deep South. This 
reinforces my argument that accumulation need not entail the dominance of 
accumulation as the primary principle of societalization. 
11 Polanyi, Great Transformation, pp. 68-9. 
12 Polanyi interpreted fascism as a totalitarian attempt to subordinate an entire 
society to the logic of the market in the interests of the proprietors and gave an 
interesting analysis of the anti-universalist ideology of ‘blood and race’, the neo-
feudal economic structures, and the political matrix in which this occurred (Polanyi 
1972). For a useful discussion, based on the Polanyi archive, see Maucourant (2000: 
139-42). 
13 Oloffson offers a similar threefold analysis of Polanyi’s work on embeddedness. 
He suggests that ‘Polanyi’s concept can be defined … as a combination of three sets 
of linkages: (a) connections between economic and non-economic institutions (or 
parts of societies) on the macro-level; (b) relations between actors and institutions on 
the levels of social relations (cf. the contribution of Granovetter); (c) a second-order 
systematic linking of these two sets of connections (a macro-micro link)’ (1995: 74). 
My own account of the three levels rests on general reflections on implications of the 
three theoretical approaches considered in this article (see Jessop 1997b). 
14 Swedberg (1997: 165) has argued that ‘[w]hereas Karl Polanyi … introduced the 
notion of embeddedness to emphasize that the economy was an organic part of 
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society in pre-capitalist times, Granovetter’s point was nearly the opposite, namely to 
show that economic actions are truly social actions in capitalist society’ (165). This 
claim is misleading because it conflates the first and second levels of embeddedness 
that are distinguished here. 
15 Swedberg (1997: 171) claims that Polanyi used the term ‘embeddedness’ only 
twice in a casual manner in The Great Transformation and only gave it a ‘half-
hearted’ theoretical status in his comments on the economy as an instituted process. 
This claim is doubly misleading: first, it mistakes words and concepts; and, second, it 
ignores the critical distinction between the substantive and formal concepts of the 
economy in Polanyi’s work, which is dependent in turn on the distinction between an 
embedded economy and an institutionally separate economic system. On the first 
point, Oloffson has shown that Polanyi uses various words to describe 
embeddedness in The Great Transformation, including ‘submerged’, ‘enmesh’, 
‘intertwined’, ‘absorbed in’, ‘accessories of’, ‘compatible with’, ‘embodied in’, 
‘accessory feature of’, ‘formed part of’, and ‘subordination’. He adds that ‘[a]ll these 
different expressions are either linguistic varieties of the same concept (i.e., 
embeddedness) or they take up partly different specialized meanings of the general 
concept’ (Oloffson 1995: 86). On the second point, this critical distinction is 
developed most fully – and certainly not ‘half-heartedly’ – in Polanyi’s posthumously 
published synthesis of his life’s work (Polanyi 1977). 
16 For a Polanyian account of the role of haute finance in contemporary capitalism, 
see E. Helleiner (2000) ‘Globalization and haute finance -- déjà vu?’, in K. McRobbie 
and Kari Polanyi Levitt, eds, Karl Polanyi in Vienna. The Contemporary Significance 
of ‘The Great Transformation’, Montreal: Black Rose Press, **. 
17 Time-space distantiation can also anchor present action to the past through the 
'politics of memory' and/or organizational techniques such as written records. See 
Giddens 1984. 
18 This can occur either by reducing the time it takes to produce a given ‘event’ or by 
increasing the ability to discriminate more steps in an ‘event’, thereby enhancing 
opportunities to modify its course or outcome by intervening as the event happens. 
19 Luhmann does consider pre-capitalist economies in terms of their lack of 
functional differentiation from other systems and their organization in terms of 
segmentary or centre-periphery relations (1986, 1995). And, although the RA has 
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shown little interest in pre-capitalist economic formations, Polanyi’s account shows 
strong similarities to that in Marx’s notebooks on this important topic (Marx 1980). 
20 At best Polanyi refers to the key role of mechanization in creating the conditions for 
the extension of the commodity form to land and labour-power. See Polanyi, Great 
Transformation, pp. 00-00. It is also worth noting that regulationists have considered 
distribution under the rubric of the differential articulation of forms of production and 
consumption in different accumulation regimes. In this sense distribution re-enters 
RA analyses as an effect of different linkages between production and consumption 
or as an effect of a broader institutionalised compromise that helps to sustain 
(reproduce, regularise) specific accumulation regimes. 
21 The principal exception here is Alain Lipietz, whose early work was concerned with 
land and rent and who has more recently developed a regulationist approach to 
political ecology. See, for example, A. Lipietz (1994) Green Hopes: the Foundations 
of Political Ecology, Cambridge: Polity. 
22 Luhmann argues that Marxism is a pre-modern theory because it assumes that 
one system (in this case, the economy) can occupy the central position in society. In 
contrast, he argues that modern society is characterized by de-centred functional 
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